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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

DISCOVERY-PROCUREMENT OF AN ORDER REQUIRING A NONRESIDENT
PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT TO AN ORAL EXAMINATION WITHIN THE STATE BEFORE TRIAL-Relator, a resident of Massachusetts, brought an action in Illinois against the Railway Express Company to recover damages for the negligent
transportation of the relator's cattle. After the cause was at issue the Express
Company's attorneys presented a motion to respondent, a superior court judge,
requesting a court order directing the nonresident relator to appear before a
n~tary public in Chicago for the purpose of an oral examination. The court
granted the order, fixing a time and place for the taking of relator's deposition
on oral interrogatories. Upon failure of the relator to appear, the court stayed
proceedings for a period extending thirty days beyond the date of the taking
of the deposition for the purposes of discovery. Relator then petitioned for a
writ of mandamus to command respondent to strike the orders from the court
records. Held, writ of mandamus granted. People ex rel. Prince v. Graber,
(Ill. 1947) 74 N.E. (2d) 865.
The court stated two possible reasons for its conclusion. First, the power
of the court to compel parties to give a deposition is purely statutory.1 The procedure provided by the Illinois statutes for the taking of pretrial depositions
makes no differentiation between party litigants and witnesses, so that the manner of taking a pretrial deposition of a nonresident party is the ·same as that
provided for the taking of a deposition of a nonresident witness.2 As the statute

Principal case at 866.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ( 1947) c. II o, § 182 ( 2) provides that the deposition of any
other party or any person may be taken as prescribed by court rules. The applicable
court rule, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 110, § 259.19, provides that any party to a civil
action may cause the testimony of any other party or person relevant to the prosecution
or defense of the action to be taken, or oral or written interrogatories, by deposition
before trial in the manner provided by law for taking depositions in chancery cases. The
manner provided for taking depositions in chancery cases is set forth in Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1947) c. 51, §§ 24, 26 and 28, and deals with witnesses only, making no reference
to parties. Section 28 provides for the taking of the deposition of a nonresident
witness, upon oral interrogatories, after obtaining a commission from the court to take
the deposition at the place of the witness' residence.
·
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RECENT DECISIONS

requires the suing out of a commission to take the deposition of a nonresident
witness, before a properly designated officer, in the state of the domicile of the
witness,8 the order of the court directing the relator to appear in Chicago was
contrary to the statutory procedure and therefore void. In stating a second
reason for its decision, the court ruled that it could not require relator's physical
presence before any officer in Illinois merely because the relator, as plaintiff,
submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of
prosecuting his lawsuit. "Jurisdiction of the person of the relator was not for
the purpose of forcing him to do anything, and the attempt to force him to give
his pre-trial deposition before a notary public in Chicago, by an erroneous order
which was beyond the power of the court to enter, exceeded the jurisdiction of
the court." 4 Although the result of the case seems undesirable, it appears that
the court is correct in its conclusions upon both grounds. 5 Under the rules of
the common law, courts had no inherent power to order discovery. 6 The
equitable remedy of bill for discovery was developed to assist the parties in procuring necessary information to prepare their case for trial.7 This was the sole
means of discovery until legislatures began to pass statutes authorizing the
examination of parties in actions at law. 8 The Illinois statutes involved in the
principal case do not give the court power to order a nonresident plaintiff,
despite the fact that he has submitted his case to the jurisdiction of the court
for determination, to appear for examination before trial, and in the absence of
such a provision, any order requiring the relator's presence for discovery purposes
is void. As the present Illinois statutes deal solely with depositions of nonresident
witnesses, for the purpose of getting evidence to produce upon trial, it would
seem that there is a need for a statute expressly authorizing the court to order
a nonresident to appear for pre-trial discovery.9
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Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 51, § 28.
Principal case at 867.
5
Principal case at 867. The reference by the court to " ••• an erroneous order •.•" indicates that the real basis for the decision is the result of statutory interpretation, and that the court's reference to the submission of the relator's person to the
jurisdiction of the court is unnecessary.
6
RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEFORE TRIAL 12 (1932); 27 C.J.S., Discovery, § I;
Yorkshire Worsted Mills v. National Transit Co., 325 Pa. 427 at 429, 190 A. 897
(1937); Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 167 Ala. 557 at
561, 52 S. 751 (1910). This lack of inherent power in the court to order discovery
appears to apply equally to residents and nonresidents.
7
Ibid.
8
RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 12 et seq. (1932). Statutes authorizing
courts of common law, to grant discovery without the necessity of resort to chancery
were first passed in England in 18 54.
9
It seems clear that a state has power to authorize its courts to order a nonresident plaintiff to come into the forum and submit to preliminary examination. See
the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto
Exchange Corp., 262 U.S. 544 at 552, 43 S.Ct. 636 (1923). See also RAGLAND,
DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 77-79 (1932); 27 C.J.S. 41, 57 and 75; E. Richard
Meinig Co. v. U.S. Fastener Corp., 194 App. Div. 397, 185 N.Y.S. 320 (1920);
Duncan v. Jacobson, 187 Misc. 918, 66 N.Y.S. (2d) 369 (1946).
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